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These Briefings have been drafted by the Parliament Secretariat Task Force 
on the Intergovernaental Conference. Their purpose is to gather together, 
in an organized, SUJIIJiarY form, the proposals and suggestions which the 
authorities in the Member States, the union's institutions and specialist 
COIIIIDentators have put forward on the issues likely to be on the IGC/96 
agenda. 
Briefings will be updated as negotiations proceed. 
Already out: 
1 The Court of Justice 
2 The Commission 
3 The Court of Auditors, ESC and COR 
4 Differentiated integration 
5 The common foreign and security policy 
6 The role of the national parliaments 
7 The hierarchy of Community acts 
8 Codecision procedure 
9 CJHA 
1 0 European citizenship 
11 WEU, security and defence 
12 Public services 
13 Social policy 
14 The European Parliament 
15 The European Council 
16 The Council of the European Union 
17 The budget and the IGC 
18 The IGC and transparency 
19 Subsidiarity and the separation of powers 
20 Legal personality and the Union's foreign representation 
21 Commitology 
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1. Summary 
BRIEFING 
ON 
COMMITOLOGY 
'Commitology' may be defined as a process for adopting measures to implement 
legislative acts. In this process measures are adopted by the Commission, 
assisted by a committee of experts from the Member States. 
The commitology process was devised when the Council began delegating executive 
powers to the Commission. It was first introduced in 1962 to implement a series 
of Council regulations organizing the market in agricultural products and has 
continued to be used in the CAP sphere. The number of such committees has grown 
considerably since then. 
The Single European Act added a third indent to Article 145 of the EEC Treaty, 
which reads: 'the Council shall ... confer on the Commission, in the acts which 
the Council adopts, powers for the implementation of the rules which the Council 
lays down. The Council may impose certain requirements in respect of the 
exercise of these powers. The Council may also reserve the right, in specific 
cases, to exercise directly implementing powers itself. The procedures referred 
to above must be consonant with principles and rules to be laid down in advance 
by the Council ... '. 
On 13 July 1987 the Council used this text as the basis for adopting what is 
known as the Commitology decision, laying down the procedures for the exercise 
of implementing powers conferred on the Commission. It was in fact the first 
legal act to be adopted under the Single European Act's provisions. 
The decision sets out three procedures in which the Commission is assisted by 
a committee, composed of representatives of the Member States and chaired by a 
Commission representative. While under the first procedure the committee is 
purely advisory, in the second and third (each of which has two variants) the 
committee has the power to send the issue back to the Council. 
In January 1995 the 'Modus vivendi' agreed between Parliament, the Council and 
the Commission on the subject of commitology states that Parliament must be 
fully informed of any measures under the commitology procedure when the basic 
legislation is adopted by codecision (under Article 189b of the EC Treaty). 
Indeed, the Modus vivendi is one of the sources of the Conference agenda, since 
its third paragraph says, 'the three institutions note that the question of the 
implementing measures for acts adopted in accordance with the procedure laid 
down in Article 189b of the EC Treaty, when the adoption of such measures is 
entrusted to the Commission, will be examined in the course of the revision of 
the Treaties planned for 1996, at the request of the European Parliament, the 
Commission and several Member States. The Reflection Group will be invited to 
examine the question.' 
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2. Parliament's resolution of 17 May 1995 
Paragraph 32 ( ii) of the resolution says 'existing "commi tology" procedures 
should be simplified. General responsibility for implementing measures should 
be devolved to the Commission (which may use an Advisory Committee to help in 
the formulation of the measure, but not type 2 or type 3 Committees, which would 
be abolished). The Council and Parliament should be informed of the measures 
proposed and should each have the opportunity to reject the Commission's 
decision and to call either for new implementing measures or for full 
legislative procedures.' 
On the budgetary aspect, in late 1994 during the 1995 budget procedure 
Parliament adopted an amendment to place in the reserve the appropriations for 
the budget lines intended to finance the various committees. 'l'he total sum 
involved was around ECU 17.5 m, to cover the operating expenses of about 430 
regulatory, management and advisory committees, apart from the committees set 
up under specific research programmes. However, the funds were released after 
information on their operation was received from the Commission. 
3. Commission report of 10 May 1995 
In paragraphs 51 and 52 the Commission says 'since the codecision procedure was 
written into the Treaty, Parliament has felt that the Council should no longer 
have the sole power to delegate or intervene in the task of implementing 
measures adopted under the codecision procedure, but that Parliament should also 
be involved. It was because of this disagreement with the Council that, for the 
first time, Parliament rejected a proposal at third reading - the proposal for 
a directive on voice telephony. To avoid further cases of stalemate,' the 
Commission continues, 'on 20 December 1994 the institutions agreed a modus 
vivendi which will apply until the matter is reviewed at the 1996 
Intergovernmental Conference.' 
The Commission has never proposed the type 3(b) committee procedure in the above 
1987 decision, considering it 'illogical since it can lead to a situation in 
which no decision is taken. With this reservation, the Commission believes that 
the implementing procedures operate satisfactorily and present no major 
obstacles to actual implementation' . They also have the advantage of 'more 
closely involving national government departments; these bear most of the 
responsibility for applying Community measures in practice.' 
4. Council report of 20 April 1995 
On this subject the Council confines itself to commenting (on page 13) that 
application of the codecision procedure introduced by the Maastricht Treaty has 
been complicated by 'the linkage which was initially established with other 
matters (including committee procedure and amounts deemed necessary) which has 
held up the adoption of several texts.' 
5. Position of the Member States 
(a) Spain: the March 1995 document, the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference. 
Starting-points for a discussion, points out that the Commission and Parliament 
have put forward new proposals on the codecision procedure and that ways must 
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be found of enabling Parliament to take part in the committee procedure or 
commitology, which also needs to be simplified. 
(b) AuStria: in its Guidelines on probable subjects at the 1996 IGC published 
in June 1995 the Austrian Government comes out in favour of extending 
Parliament's legislative and control powers. To this end, it goes on, ways of 
simplifying legislative and commitology procedures must be discussed. 
(c) Netherlands: the government's Fourth Memorandum on institutional reform of 
the European Union, submitted to the Dutch parliament on 12 July 1995, deals 
with a number of matters to do with the Union's principles and legislative 
procedures and the need for institutional balance. On commi to logy the Memorandum 
simply says that the Dutch Government favours a constructive approach to the 
matter, and points out that the need for efficiency and democracy in Community 
decision-making means organizing the committees in a simpler and more open way. 
6. The Reflection Group 
(a) At its meeting of 24-25 July 1995 Group tackled the subject of commitology 
in conjunction with the hierarchy of Community acts. Some representatives 
thought that these subjects raised the issue of institutional balance but that 
there was no need to change it because Article 189 EC was sufficiently clear and 
flexibility was essential. Others took the view that more power should be 
delegated to the Commission but that Parliament and the Council should maintain 
a power of control and review over Commission decisions. In this scheme of 
things, some Group representatives underlined the linkage between the hierarchy 
of acts and implementing powers: the issue of delegating power to the Commission 
needed to be simplified, to avoid the subject of commitology. 
At the same meeting one view was that implementing acts should be better framed 
to avoid overburdening the legislative process, while keeping an eye on the 
Commission and clearly defining the transfer of powers. It was unacceptable to 
Parliament for control to be exercised by the Council on its own: the two 
institutions should be on an equal footing. 
Another view argued for revising commi to logy (the powers for implementing 
Community law) by increasing the delegations in the Commission's favour, under 
the political control of the Council and Parliament. 
(b) The interim report drawn up by the chairman of the Reflection Group on the 
1996 IGC highlights the two main lines of thought that have emerged in its 
deliberations: 
(i) the first wants the present committee system to be scrapped, because it 
already seems too confused and complicated, and would be hard to adapt to any 
further round of Community enlargement; 
(ii) the second, however, believes the 1987 commitology decision should be 
upheld and points out that the Council must not be regarded as a 'Chamber of 
States' but as the Union's central institution, endowed with legislative and 
executive powers which it must preserve in order to comply with the letter and 
the spirit of the constituent Treaty. Accordingly, say members of the Group 
taking this view, to scrap commitology and transfer the implementing powers to 
the Commission would be to endanger the institutional balance as it is designed 
at present. 
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In the face of these two opposing views a middle way would seem to be required. 
Some members of the Group think it could take the form of action to simplify 
commitology. This would involve replacing the present procedures with a single 
procedure, under which, as they see it, the Commission would be responsible for 
deciding on suitable implementing measures, under the scrutiny of the Council 
and Parliament and after consulting the national experts, by applying the normal 
legislative procedures. One member of the Reflection Group proposes that the 
opposition of three Member States in the Council should be enough to prevent an 
implementing measure from going ahead. 
7. Other views 
As far as recent legal comment is concerned, Kieran Bradley in Commitology and 
the law: through a glass, darkly (Common Market Law Review 1992, p. 693) argues 
that since the third indent was added to Article 145 of the EEC Treaty 
delegation to the Commission, which used to be optional and could be subject to 
conditions, has become obligatory and the reserve in favour of the Council is 
now subject to conditions. Adding the third indent implies a major step towards 
a new definition of the separation of powers between the Community institutions, 
concentrating the bulk of implementing power in the Commission. 
Keen Lenaerts, a judge with the Community's Court of First Instance, writes in 
Regulating the regulatory process: delegation of powers in the European 
Community (European Law Review, February 1995) that Court of Justice case law 
accepts the delegation of powers in so far as the balance of power inherent in 
the constitutional structure of the Community remains unchanged. Maintaining 
that balance is essential to preserve democratic legitimacy. 
Justus Lipsius, in The 1996 IGC (European Law Review No 3, June 1995), thinks 
the Treaty should clearly establish that the procedures for implementing 
legislative acts form part of the Commission's powers and may not be reserved 
for the Council. Hence the commitology decision of 13 July 1987 should be 
simplified, mainly by scrapping Procedure 3, and converted into a protocol 
annexed to the Treaty. Parliament should be informed of any implementing 
measures adopted on this basis, but it should not be involved in any way in the 
procedure by which such measures are adopted. 
With a view to the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference the International European 
Movement has set up an Initiative Committee chaired by Professor Jean-Victor 
Louis. The Movement's Secretary-General, Mr Dastoli, said on 5 July 1995 that 
commitology was one of the main issues that still needed to be clarified. 
* * * * * 
For any further information please contact Mr Rufus Quintana, Legal Service, 
Ext. 3926 (Lux) or 2709 (Str), or Mr Caiola, Legal Service, Ext. 4818 (Lux) or 
7007 (Str). 
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